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The British strategy of dividing Cyprus ultimately enabled its independence

The events leading up to Cyprus gaining independence from Great Britain in 1960 were not the result of instrumental rational calculations, argues sociologist Chares Demetriou in a recently published paper. Instead, a complicated series of interactions between several actors clouded the colonizer's judgement, ultimately leading to the inadvertent independence of Cyprus.

A relatively late colonial acquisition of the British Empire, Cyprus gained independence during the decolonization wave following WWII. But unlike many other historical instances of decolonization in this period, independence was nobody’s goal in the case of Cyprus. What is more, key players in this case were not only the colonial centre and the colonial periphery, but also third countries, namely Turkey and Greece. In the recently published article “Divide and rule Cyprus? Decolonisation as process” in the journal Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Chares Demetriou, researcher at the Department of Sociology, examines the relatively peculiar decolonizing instance of Cyprus from a new epistemological standpoint, shedding new light on an aspect of past politics that is still current in Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece.

Demetriou argues that instances of decolonization be considered processes featuring complicated interactions that are both path-depended and open-ended. This perspective contrasts with reductionist views, particularly ones presuming clear-headed rational calculations. Considering the decolonization of Cyprus as a complicated process, he argues that what shaped the process in a crucial way was the colonial insistence on a strategy of divide-and-rule. This, together with the complicated flow of interactions featured in this process, obscured the British government’s ability to assess the unfolding predicament clearly. Most particularly, the government failed to rank its options optimally by misreading the option of granting independence to Cyprus, resisting this option for some time before being forced by Turkey and Greece to accept it.

 

Read “Divide and rule Cyprus? Decolonisation as process” at Commonwealth & Comparative Politics website.

Find more of Chares Demetriou's research on his personal page.

Photo of Chares Demetriou by Jessica Björck
Chares Demetriou (Ph.D. 2005, Columbia University) is a political and historical sociologist with primary expertise on Ireland and Cyprus. Prior to his arrival in Lund, he held appointments in Russia, the UK (Northern Ireland), Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Israel/Palestine, Italy, and the US, including four postdoctoral fellowships.